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While global media were grappling with the smoke and mirrors of  
Russia’s meddling in elections and referenda in 2018, both in the 
‘free’ and not-so-free worlds, cold war spies were headline news in 
France for an entirely different kind of  intervention. 
In the archive of  documents that came under the scrutiny 
of  Bulgaria’s Dossier Committee, Julia Kristeva, code name Sa-
bina, was identified as one of  more than fifteen thousand intel-
ligence recruits who worked closely with an appointed agent in 
Bulgaria’s equivalent of  the KGB.1 The Kristeva scandal broke in 
April and then gradually fizzled out as the attention of  the French 
press turned to retired counter-intelligence agent Raymond Nart’s 
1  Jennifer Schuessler and Boryana Dzhambazova, “Bulgaria Says 
French Thinker Was a Secret Agent. She Calls it a ‘Barefaced Lie’,” New York 
Times, April 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/arts/julia-kriste-
va-bulgaria-communist-spy.html; Richard Wolin, “Was a Renowned Literary 
Theorist Also a Spy? The Strange Case of  Julia Kristeva,” Chronicle of  Higher Ed-
ucation, June 20, 2018, https://www.chronicle.com/article/Was-a-Renowned-
Literary/243719; Dimeter Kenarov, “Was The Philosopher Julia Kristeva a 
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first-hand account of  his life-long obsession with Kojève, chief  ne-
gotiator of  France’s foreign economic policy in the fifties and six-
ties, and famed philosopher of  the end of  history. Nart’s desperate 
manhunt, his repeatedly failed attempts to have Kojève cornered 
and interrogated, ended on a deflationary note when the latter 
dropped dead in Brussels in 1968.2 
If  Kristeva’s spy allegations sent shockwaves across the 
circles of  French theory, and were considered as an implicit in-
dictment of  the historically established incompetence of  the DST 
(France’s directorate of  territorial security), Kojève’s case is an en-
tirely different story.3 The DST had been building up a dossier on 
Kojève’s involvement with the world of  intelligence and the Stalin-
ist state since the early nineteen eighties and the so-called Fare-
well Dossier.4 The regurgitation of  this same old story in the 2018 
spring issue of  Commentaire proved to be quite the showstopper in 
an otherwise bland collection of  disgruntled and disaffected es-
says about emerging global threats, economic uncertainty and the 
failure of  the idea of  Europe. In the same issue, a prominent head-
liner and one of  the journal’s regular contributors, Francis Fuku-
yama, is once again explaining and updating his end of  history 
thesis. Amidst this chorus of  Hegelian beautiful souls, and rather 
worryingly, Nart’s piece refers to Kojève with his Russian name 
‘Kojevnikov’ and appears to be desperately fanning the flame of  
2  Ryamond Nart, “Alexandre Kojevnikov dit Kojève: Un homme de 
l’ombre,” Commentaire 1. 161 (2018): 129-228. Nart’s allegations have been pub-
lished, almost word for word, more than ten years ago in Eric Merlen and Fré-
déric Ploquin, Carnets intimes de la DST: 30 ans au coeur du contre-espionnage français 
(Paris: Fayard, 2003), 191- 216.
3  Robert Maggiori, “Un K à part” Libération, November 20, 1997.
4  All this was a decade before the defection of  KGB archivist Vassili Mi-
trokin to the UK in 1991, and the fabricated information in the welcome pack 
handed out by General Mihai Caraman to two DST officials at the end of  their 
visit to Bucharest in 1992. In these two documents, Raymond Nart came across 
a reference to a ‘white Russian’ and ‘a philosopher’ and speculated that these 
were code names for Kojève. If  Raymond Nart’s investigations came to nothing 
as they were mostly based on inconclusive evidence, he was, nonetheless, instru-
mental in leaking his ‘white Russian’ or ‘Schlawer’ hypothesis to the French and 
British press almost periodically, at the rate of  one story every decade or so.
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foreignness that is now consuming not only Kojève’s philosophi-
cal and political legacy, but more broadly perhaps casting a Mc-
Carthyist shadow over former cold war intellectuals in exile. It is a 
curious fact that in the autumn of  2018, and right in the midst of  
this mess, a monograph on the Russian origins of  Kojève’s thought 
and an English translation of  one of  his early Russian manuscripts 
appeared in print. In light of  the state of  things today, what is to be 
made of  these two new additions to the Kojevean corpus?
   ‡ ‡ ‡
As is well known, in a series of  seminars between 1933-1939 on 
Hegel, Alexandre Kojève, who was at the time in his early thirties, 
turned the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris into a theatre 
of  mass disruption. Every Monday and Friday, around 5:30pm, 
Kojève would read out, translate and paraphrase selected passages 
from the Phenomenology of  Spirit with a charming Slavic accent be-
fore an audience of  A-listers, who were, reportedly, mesmerized 
and blown away by the performance of  the young Russian.
Picture an audience of  artists and poets, philosophers and 
psychologists, orientalists and anthropologists, mathematicians and 
physicists, ordained priests and Jesuit Fathers, an Egyptian couple, 
and Japanese Heideggerians, among many others. Also in the gal-
lery were the future French ambassador to Moscow, future high-
ranking diplomats and civil servants in global trade and finance, 
and even a mysterious, unidentified, heavily decorated military of-
ficer. Russian scholars have recently pointed out the overlooked 
attendance and active participation of  Russian exiles in Paris.5
Kojève’s dramatic rendition of  Hegel was first and fore-
most designed for the entertainment of  those elites. Years later, 
and long after he abandoned academia, Kojève evoked the un-
satisfactory experience of  speaking before a post-war democratic 
lecture theatre. In a packed auditorium, with students at his feet, 
5  Dimitri Tokarev, “Les Auditeurs russes ‘inaperçus’ (Gordin, Tarr, 
Poplavskij) du séminaire hégélien d’Alexandre Kojève à L’Ecole pratique des 
hautes études 1933-1939” Revue des Etudes Slaves, 88.3 (2017), 495-514.
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he felt alien to a gathering worthy of  his contemporary Jean-Paul 
Sartre, because no matter how provocative he tried to be, every 
word he said was written down with exemplary demure and apa-
thy. No one objected and no one protested.
Kojève’s ‘translation’ of  Hegel was intentionally scripted 
as a provocative narrative, which was not intended for mass con-
sumption. For almost eight decades now, the lectures have been 
popularized as the narrative of  a dramatic struggle between mas-
ters and slaves. As masters whither away, the working slaves, it is 
erroneously believed, will triumphantly bring history to an end, to 
then live happily ever after in the universal and homogenous state 
of  equal citizens. 
The main plotline of  the lectures on Hegel, and contrary 
to what is commonly believed, was not so much about the end of  
history or Marx’s Reich der freiheit [kingdom of  freedom] as it was 
about the struggle for recognition that pits a philosopher against a 
tyrant. Hegel is the philosopher who understood and justified Na-
poleon’s historical action. He heard the tyrant’s cannonballs loud 
and clear, and the least Napoleon could do was to acknowledge the 
German philosopher and summon him to join his army of  civil 
servants and special advisors. But Hegel’s wait was in vain. Kojève 
presented Napoleon’s failure to reciprocate Hegel’s recognition of  
the tyrant as the central drama of  the Phenomenology of  Spirit and 
the key to making sense of  the philosopher’s famed hypochon-
dria. At the height of  the Moscow trials, Kojève would raise the 
provocation up a notch by drawing a parallel between Napoleon’s 
historical failure to reciprocate Hegel’s recognition and what is at 
stake in declaring himself  Stalin’s consciousness. Will Stalin recog-
nize Kojève? 
Throughout the 1930s, Kojève hammered in the minds of  
the intellectual and political elites who flocked to his seminar the 
difference between doing philosophy in the company of  tyrants and 
being a philosopher in the tranquil safety of  the garden of  Epicu-
rus. As the Second World War was drawing to a dramatic close, he 
turned his back on the theatre of  French academic philosophy, and 
was already producing important policy papers, some of  which 
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appeared unsigned in print. Calling off his Stalinist challenge, he is 
now recognized on the exclusive stage of  high diplomacy, interna-
tional trade and post-war reconstruction.
   ‡ ‡ ‡
The so-called end of  history thesis, Kojève’s claim to fame and the 
shore against which many intellectual expeditions on the intrigu-
ing Russian-French philosopher have come to crash, appears to be 
the central text in Jeff Love’s The Black Circle: A Life of  Alexandre Ko-
jève. While it is not often advisable to judge a book by its cover—as 
the adage goes—The Black Circle is a serious challenge to this estab-
lished piece of  wisdom. The title’s allusion to Kazimir Malevich’s 
famous painting, reproduced on the cover of  the book, anticipates 
the gradual and systematic blotting out of  Kojève by the “foreign 
doctrines”6 of  his Russian predecessors.  
The book seems to state the obvious, albeit overlooked, 
fact that Kojève was, and had remained throughout his life, Rus-
sian in thoughts and feelings. Unfortunately, the author’s endeav-
our to underscore his subject’s Russianness was made in the spirit 
of  Nart’s amplification of  the foreign resonance of  ‘Kojevnikov’, 
more than in the spirit of  acknowledging Kojève’s contribution to 
contemporary thought in the course of  his intellectual and politi-
cal career in his adoptive country. 
Sandwiched between Dostoyevsky’s “rogue gallery”7 
of  misfits, Federov’s laughable “mad philosophy of  universal 
resurrection”8 and Soloviev’s “outlandish”9 man-god, Jeff Love re-
duced Kojève’s entire philosophical project to a “monstrous site of  
death.”10 This strikingly selective intellectual genealogy appears to 
give the author license to see the Life of  Alexandre Kojève through a 
bleak and sinister lens. Dostoyevsky, Federov and Soloviev, all do 
6  Jeff Love, The Black Circle: A Life of  Alexandre Kojève, (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2018), 163.
7  Ibid., 71.
8  Ibid., 90.
9  Ibid., 99.
10  Ibid., 289.
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indeed have something in common: they all glorified “the will to 
self-annihilation or self-immolation.”11 But Jeff Love tells us that 
Kojève was instrumental in radicalizing his Russian predecessor’s 
revelling in individual suicide by promoting a philosophy predi-
cated on and terminating in “collective madness.”12 Given this 
lens, it is tempting to read Love’s biography against itself  and in 
light of  the sort of  propaganda that Kojève himself  was so familiar 
with. Alongside his widely popularised polemic with Strauss on the 
subject of  propaganda, perhaps lesser known is his short review 
essay of  Jesuit priest Gaston Fessard’s book France, prends garde de 
perdre ta liberté [France, Beware of  Losing your Freedom].13 Speak-
ing against the unhealthy atmosphere of  paranoia stirred up by the 
demonization of  French communists as ‘bad’ citizens, as ‘nasty’ 
and ‘dangerous people’ who are putting the freedom and security 
of  decent hard-working folks in jeopardy, Kojève notes that like 
all works of  propaganda, Gaston Fessard’s book was “telling the 
truth, nothing but the truth, but not the whole truth.”14 Propa-
ganda, Kojève notes, does not need to ‘invent’ another reality; in 
fact, it does not need to invent anything. It simply abstracts one 
fragment of  reality to then present it as the reality of  all realities. 
The Black Circle may well be a fragment of  the truth about 
Kojève and his life, a work of  propaganda à la Fessard; a work 
whose author, like the followers of  the Jesuit Fathers in France and 
Belgium before him, appears to be sounding a cautionary note 
to all those who may fall under the spell of  Kojève’s thought.15 
11  Ibid., 79.
12  Ibid., 167.
13  Coincidentally, Raymond Aron’s 1979 book In Defense of  Decadent Eu-
rope, trans. Stephen Cox (London: Transactions Publishers, 1996), was originally 
titled “Europe, Beware of  Losing Your Freedom.”
14  “On dit la vérité, rien que la vérité, mais, on ne dit pas toute la vérité,” 
Alexandre Kojève, “Christinisme et Communisme,” Critique 3-4 (1946), 308-
312.
15  This line of  thought extends from Bernard Hesbois’s unpublished 
thesis “Le Live et la mort” (Université Catholique de Louvain,1985) to Shadia 
Drury’s The Roots of  Postmodern Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) and 
Stefanos Geroulanos’s An Atheism that is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010).   
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According to the author of  The Black Circle, Kojève is not only a 
Stalinist, but “one far more radical than Stalin himself,”16 and 
since he “stands for the rejection of  the modern liberal tradition 
… self-interest … self-preservation,” following his thought entails 
“march[ing] forward to our own self-cancellation in a society that 
resembles a ghastly or ghostly collection of  cadavers from which 
all life has ebbed.”17 These are, of  course, bald claims to make, 
but it is unfortunate that when he set out to validate them, the 
author lost his footing and tumbled into Kojève’s “suffocating”18 
and “eccentric”19 post-war writings with their forbidding “scho-
lastic technicity.”20 In the end, the author chose to stay too close 
to the safety of  those works’ titles and their opening chapters. He 
then concluded that the volume on the philosophy of  right is “the 
formal, legal groundwork for the Stalinist state,”21 while the vol-
umes on classic Greek philosophy are all sheer play, nonsense, and 
mindless repetitive gibberish. “What we have before us,” Love 
concludes, “is a remarkably divided body of  work. One may refer 
to that division as ironical … as inconsistent, or even farcical.”22 
Like numerous authors before him, Jeff Love departs from 
a foregone conclusion that the lectures on Hegel have literally 
and irrevocably declared history closed with Napoleon marching 
on Jena. That assumption led many critics, often doubling up as 
biographers, to put forth naïve speculations about the enormous 
amount of  unpublished manuscripts that Kojève produced be-
tween 1939 and 1968. Why did Kojève carry on writing after he 
declared history closed in his lectures on Hegel? Many critics re-
solved the matter by dismissing those works as post-historical play 
procreated by an intellect trapped in the ironist’s cage.23 The Black 
16  Love, The Black Circle, 259.
17  Ibid., 276-77.
18  Ibid., 247.
19  Ibid., 232.
20  Ibid., 237.
21  Ibid., 222.
22  Ibid., 289.
23  This is the main thesis of  Michael S. Roth. See for instance his Ironist’s 
Cage: Memory, Trauma, and the Construction of  History (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1995).
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Circle is the latest addition to that same line of  thought. Under-
scoring Kojève’s intellectual filiation with Russian ‘madness,’ and 
unable to make heads or tails of  “the ghastly visions of  the end of  
history,”24 Jeff Love concluded that: 
Kojève offers two radically opposed alternatives: a continua-
tion of  the nonsense of  history that heads nowhere and achieves 
nothing … or a history whose aim is to cancel itself  out in a 
final end that frees human beings from the otherwise nonsensical 
muddle that history must be in absence of  a definitive end.25
Such a reading is symptomatic of two difficult issues that readers 
of  Kojève have been faced with. The first difficulty has something 
to do with our inability to locate fragments of  his writings in his 
mysterious system of  knowledge. The second difficulty has some-
thing to do with the unresolved biographical puzzle of  his radical 
and sudden change of  career from academic philosophy to poli-
tics. Our inability to make sense of  Kojève’s political action echoes 
our inability to make sense of  his philosophy. 
Since The Black Circle claims to be aimed at the general pub-
lic, it is important to point out the set of  concerns it poses for 
post-truth societies. Firstly, this book appears to have indulged in a 
rather irresponsible treatment of  the theme of  suicide in the con-
text of  a global mental health epidemic. Secondly, it seems to be 
attributing irrationality, madness and self-immolation to all things 
Eastern. These two prominent themes in the book should not go 
unchallenged. 
The Black Circle contends that Kojève’s work “promotes 
an essentially totalitarian political vision”26 according to which 
“the certainty of  servitude is preferable to the uncertainty of  
freedom.”27 This is a brand of  “philosophical Stalinism”28 that 
24  Love, The Black Circle, 190.
25  Ibid., 203.
26  Ibid., 279.
27  Ibid., 280.
28  Ibid., 10.
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“beckons us toward freedom from freedom.”29 When he intersects 
Russian literary fiction with Kojève’s philosophy around the theme 
of  ‘madness’ and ‘nonsense’ masquerading as “radical desire for 
emancipation,”30 Jeff Love deploys the same argument to under-
score the vacuity and foreignness of  emancipation narratives that 
came to us from the East.
In the final analysis, Kojève’s Russianness is framed as an in-
terference with “European thought,”31 a distant echo of  the cor-
rupt ideas festering in the build up to, and immediate aftermath of  
the “nascent Soviet Union of  the 1920s.”32 More disturbing per-
haps is the author’s taking too much liberty with imputing mad-
ness, self-immolation, suicide and nonsense to Eastern and ‘Asiatic’ 
thought. We are in “the circle of  Eastern conceptions of  mindless 
or intentionless action … a point where thought can no longer be 
aware of  itself  … a kind of  automation.”33
   ‡ ‡ ‡
If  in The Black Circle Kojève was cast as “a clever ironist” and 
a “dogmatic Hegelian,” in Atheism, he is believed to be “deadly 
serious.”34 Atheism is a fragment from an unfinished book project. 
It was written between early August and mid-October in 1931. 
First translated from Russian by Kojève’s life-long partner Nina 
Ivanoff and her sister, the text appeared in print in 1998 against 
the backdrop of  what were by then widely publicised allegations 
that Kojève was a Soviet mole. In 2007, a Russian edition of  the 
29  Ibid., 280.
30  Ibid., 32.
31  Ibid., 163.
32  Ibid., 276.
33  Ibid., 201. On few occasions, the author hints at other ‘Eastern’ con-
nections such as “Buddhism and the Wu Wei” (Ibid., 201). Such statements are 
based on inadequate familiarity with Indian and other variants of  Buddhist 
philosophies, and an equally flawed understanding of  the influence they exerted 
on different aspects of  Kojève’s philosophy. 
34  Jeff Love, “Introduction: Atheism and Politics” in Atheism by Alexandre 
Kojève, trans. Jeff Love (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), xiv.
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text was included in a volume of  collected works prefaced with an 
introductory essay by neo-Eurasian academic A. M. Rutkevich, 
marking the symbolic re-appropriation of  Kojève by readers from 
his native Russia. The publication of  Jeff Love’s translation in 2018 
coincided with Raymond Nart’s autobiographical account of  the 
low-stakes game of  hide-and-seek he played with Kojève for al-
most two decades. 
If  the publication of  those different translations of  Athe-
ism was repeatedly upstaged by spying allegations, detracting from 
any serious engagement with its intellectual significance, the fault 
does not entirely lie with tabloid sensationalism or an obscure in-
telligence plot in which Raymond Nart continues to play a central 
role. A fragment known to Kojève’s biographers, commentators 
and translators since at least the early 1990s, Atheism had been, 
from the outset, framed with unsympathetic readings, perhaps in 
part due to its strong ‘Eastern’ resonances. The prefaces to the 
Russian, French and Italian translations, all concurred in labelling 
the text a piece of  religious philosophy where an ‘early’ Kojève was 
trying to find a ‘path towards God’ before his sudden conversion 
to the dark side of  Hegelianism. The introduction to the English 
translation is a continuation of  the theses put forth in The Black 
Circle on Kojève’s “Russian roots,”35 and the failure of  all emanci-
patory narratives because “no attempt at liberation from the world 
is possible.”36 Such speculations about the purpose and content of  
Atheism could not be further from the truth. 
To begin with, readings of  the manuscript as religious phi-
losophy or as negative theology do not hold in light of  Kojève’s 
premise that the theist and atheist ‘intuitions’ are outside religion, 
and that their “dispute … is logical, psychological, ontological, 
etc., but in no way religious.”37 Not only is this dispute “actually 
… outside religion,” but more importantly “religiosity must be to 
35  Jeff Love, “Introduction: Atheism and politics,” xi.
36  Ibid., xxv.
37  Alexandre Kojève, Atheism, trans. Jeff Love (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2018), 10.
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some extent independent of  the problem of  God.”38 There is an 
“extra-religious” religious attitude, one where not only something, 
but also the “nothing [can] function religiously.”39
The theist-atheist doppelganger is very much akin to a heu-
ristic device reminiscent of, but not exactly the same as, the Lec-
tures’ master-slave dialectic. In Atheism, the theist-atheist dialectic 
initiated Kojève’s reflection on a systematic articulation between 
ontology and phenomenology, (given) being and (empirical) exis-
tence, where another aspect of  the cognition (of  objective reality) 
can be engaged beyond the two possibilities set forth in Hegelian 
logic.40 This problem can make sense only when the scholarship on 
Kojève sheds some light on his mysterious philosophical system. In 
the meantime, the reader of  Atheism can make a more informed 
judgement regarding the widely exaggerated influence of  Hei-
degger on Kojève’s philosophy. Rather than repeating Heidegger 
or even relying exclusively on his terminology, as the translator’s 
note contends, Kojève’s sporadic references to the 1929 lecture 
‘Was ist Metaphysik?’ are amplified by the strong Russian resonances 
of  the intellectual tradition which Atheism is partly in conversation 
with. 
It is neither the ‘nothing’ of  the atheist nor the ‘something’ 
of  the theist taken separately that matters. Rather it is the nothing-
something (nothing given as something), and the something-nothing 
(something given as nothing), that are constitutive of  the something-
ness [nechtost’] of  something-other. This is not exclusively Hei-
degger’s Nichtung, but something else, perhaps close to the some-
thing-other depicted in Mikhail Bakhtin’s Towards a Philosophy of  the 
Act (1919-21) as ‘otherwiseness’ [inakovost’]. At the extreme end of  
38  Ibid., 11.
39  Ibid., 14.
40  The question for Kojève is how to grasp both the ‘fact’ and ‘form’ of  
being. see. Ibid., 4. In Hegel’s logic, still according to Kojève, the latter is impos-
sible, as the philosopher will have to settle for the deduction of  ‘all attributes of  
[being] from the concept of  being,’ but when encountering ‘non-being’ as one 
of  those attributes of  (pure) being, we are already engaged in thinking ‘becom-
ing’, thus losing sight of  the initial task of  grasping the form as well as fact of  
being. Ibid., 129. 
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this argument, there is the restitution of  our sense of  community 
with self, with others and with the world, which is also a question 
that occupied Russian thought, mainly via Soloviev and the early 
Slavophil philosophers of  the nineteenth century. This is the no-
tion of  Sobornost’ or communality. Atheism partly resonates with this 
debate; it alternates Bakhtin’s ideal of  outsideness with Soloviev’s 
ideal of  communality, difference and identity, homogeneity and 
heterogeneity, ‘familiar closeness’ and ‘terrible strangeness.’ 
Kojève is exceptionally good at layering his knowledge of  
Russian philosophy and thought with a tangled web of  intellectual 
undercurrents, which span eastern and western thought, classic and 
modern philosophical traditions, including the latter’s continental 
and analytic variants. Atheism, like almost any other fragment from 
his oeuvre, engages a wide spectrum of  research specialisms across 
different subjects, broadly converging onto one fundamental ques-
tion: why is there something rather than nothing? Should philoso-
phy and science occupy themselves with non-existent entities that 
have no corresponding ontic status in traditional ontology?
Non-being, the non-existent, and the doctrine of  non-things 
are rooted in the founding texts of  Western ontology, namely via 
Parmenides and Plato’s Sophist as well as the Hellenistic school of  
Stoicism and the school of  Pyrrhonism, which are given a great 
deal of  attention in Kojève’s post-war writings. Another thread 
lends itself  to interesting comparative readings with Husserl’s 
discovery of  categorical intuition, Brentano and Whitehead, but 
also the theorizing of  intentional objects in the work of  Austrian 
philosopher Alexius Meinong. Atheism is contemporaneous with 
Husserl’s 1929 Paris Vorträge [Paris lectures] on the Cartesian Medita-
tions, which were published in French translation in 1931 thanks to 
Emmanuel Levinas and Alexandre Koyré. Around the same time, 
Kojève was intensively engaged with debates around the crisis of  
modern physics, and studying mathematics at the Sorbonne and 
with a private tutor. These and many other threads attest to Ko-
jève’s familiarity with ancient and modern Western philosophical 
tradition, and anything beyond this tradition continues to be over-
looked in the critical reception of  his work. 
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There is, however, another ancient context where the con-
cept of  the non-existent (Abhava) was discussed in different schools 
of  Hindu philosophies of  knowledge. Kojève is particularly atten-
tive to this line of  thought in extended footnotes across the text. 
Beyond Meinong’s jungle and his homeless non-existent entities, 
Hume’s golden mountain, “centaurs and quaternions,”41 “√₂, or 
a square circle,”42 Hilbert’s infinite hotel, Dirac’s sea or Cantor’s 
set theory, Atheism will take the reader on a journey across terrify-
ing, weird and out-worldly spaces reminiscent of  Pushkin’s Ruslan 
and Liudmila (1820) where “on footpaths no one has explored/ are 
tracks of  beasts no one has seen.”43
   ‡ ‡ ‡
Biographical accounts are useful in shedding some light on the 
context in which Atheism was written. Kojève’s fortune was wiped 
out in the 1929 stock-market crash. Around the same time, he 
contracted a rare and incurable illness from which he never re-
covered. Two years later, he was divorced, never to marry again; 
but it will not be long before he learned of  his Jewish ex-wife’s 
short-lived marriage to a civil servant of  the Third Reich, and then 
of  her suicide in Berlin. Kojève was apparently well aware of  his 
ex-wife’s mental health, and he prevented many of  her suicide at-
tempts when they were together. It is quite possible that he had to 
live with the guilt and sadness of  Cecile Shoutak’s tragic end. In 
short, the bleak overtones of  Kojève’s writings in the beginning of  
the 30s did not escape the notice of  biographers who identified in 
the aforementioned sequence of  historical and personal events the 
roots of  cynical and nihilistic tendencies in their subject’s charac-
ter and thought. 
41  Alexandre Kojève, Atheism, 16.
42  Ibid., 136.
43  Alexander Pushkin, Ruslan and Lyudmila, trans. Roger Clarke (Surrey: 
Alma Classics, 2005), 5. Jeff Love appears to be unaware of  this translation or 
of  the provenance of  the quote, which he renders as: “there on unknown roads 
there are the tracks of  unseen beasts” (Ibid., 134).
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Biographical fetishism aside, it is worth noting that in 1931 
Kojève was in desperate need of  validating his German degree to 
secure an academic job in France. Therefore, he had every com-
pelling practical reason to work on his French and German publi-
cations instead of  writing a Russian text to discuss atheism. There 
appears to be a similar pattern in his unpublished manuscripts, 
namely, a mysterious sense of  urgency to write in Russian at the 
most inconvenient time possible. Unlike his writings in French or 
German, Kojève’s Russian manuscripts seem to be directly ad-
dressed to the people of  Russia and to a future generation of  read-
ers in his country of  birth. This leads us to a pertinent comparison 
with Dostoyevsky’s “Atheism.” During a stay in Florence, Italy in 
1868-69, Dostoyevsky revealed in letters sent to close friends and 
family his plans to resume work on what he described as “his testa-
ment, the summit of  his writing career,”44 stressing that the book 
could not be written in Europe because its primary material had to 
be derived from Russian reality. Was Kojève’s Atheism, which was 
written barely a few years after its author settled in Paris, a Russian 
or a European book? 
Contrary to Jeff Love’s nihilistic theses, there are impor-
tant textual references to Dostoyevsky other than the ones he cites 
in The Black Circle, which are conducive to a more composed and 
productive reading of  Kojève. Dostoyevsky’s literary and sociologi-
cal reflection on suicide was an open critique of  atheism and its 
affiliated social utopia. He believed the act to be more suitable 
“in the kingdom of  the devil on earth” where stone is turned into 
bread and all material needs are satisfied. In Dostoyevsky’s view, it 
is precisely in such utopia that one must expect a severe outbreak 
of  the epidemic of  suicide, because “where everything has been 
done and there is nothing more to do ... people would be overcome 
by boredom and sickness of  heart.”45 Taking our bearings from 
Dostoyevsky’s belief  that a book on Russian atheism must be writ-
44  Jacques Catteau, Dostoyevsky and the Process of  Literary Creation, trans. 
Audrey Littlewood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 231.
45  Fyodor Dostoyevsky, A Writer’s Diary, trans. Kenneth Lantz, ed. Gary 
Saul Morson (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2009), 118.
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ten in Russia, it is important to identify the intended addressee and 
geopolitics of  Kojève’s Atheism.  
Nikolai Berdyaev’s psychological study on the theme of  sui-
cide, which was directly aimed at Russian exiles in Europe, was 
coincidentally written and published in Paris the same year as Athe-
ism. It is unfortunate that this important text does not get a men-
tion in The Black Circle and its lengthy discussion of  the theme of  
suicide in Russian literature. Berdyaev’s On Suicide (1931) displaces 
the ‘epidemic of  suicide’ from the (pre-revolutionary) social utopia 
of  Dostoyevsky to a post-revolutionary Russian diaspora united in 
a shared condition of  suffering caused by ‘Bolshevik evils.’ Berdy-
aev’s suicidals are radically individualistic, cut off from the com-
fort of  home, estranged from their national identity, and subjected 
to the hardships of  material need. The booklet is an instruction 
manual on ‘how to survive revolutions’ from the standpoint of  the-
ism; it condemns suicide as double transgression of  the divine laws 
of  eternity and the temporality of  human order. On a subjective 
psychological level, the act of  suicide, in Berdyaev’s view, reflects 
‘effeminate’ hopelessness and ‘unmanly’ weakness of  character.46
Although Atheism can be read as a critical antithesis of  
Berdyaev’s moralism, it is primarily a book concerned with the 
question of  method in the context of  Kojève’s own philosophical 
system in outline. Positing that suicide is, philosophically speak-
ing, the ultimate expression of  a paradoxical free act that puts an 
end to freedom; Kojève set out to deduce from this act the notions 
of  negativity, opposition and difference that erupt between being 
and non-being, existence and the non-existent, the real and the 
un-real, thought and the un-thought. For Kojève, this in-between 
is not the sphere of  an extra-ontology, as it is the case for instance 
with Meinong, but something situated within, and constitutive of, 
objective reality. Already at this point, we can see Lacan’s shadow 
46  Atheism is written in the first person, and makes direct references to 
the author’s philosophical meditations. The rather ill-informed decision of  Jeff 
Love to use ‘feminine pronouns throughout’ although ‘in Russian all of  these 
pronouns are grammatically masculine,’ resulted in a disfigured text, and one 
which is very remote from what its author intended for it to achieve. 
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lurking in the background of  this line of  thought, not least because 
while Kojève was writing his Russian manuscript on the ontology 
of  the non-existent in the summer of  1931, Lacan was composing 
a poem, precisely on the hiatus irrationalis.47
The ontology of  the hiatus irrationalis can be partly located 
in the current of  ideas that broadly developed around Weimar 
philosophers’ attempts to theorise an adequate method for under-
standing history. Early in the twentieth century, this was precisely 
the debate that concerned Weber’s reflection on the irrational char-
acter of  empirical reality and the problem of  method entailed in 
applying concepts to a fragment of  this reality. Rickert and Emile 
Lask brought this hiatus irrationalis into the method of  doing social 
science research.48 There is no doubt that Kojève, who studied with 
Rickert in Heidelberg, was familiar with these debates in the late 
20s and early 30s. Neither ‘extra-ontology’ nor meontology (as in 
Hindu philosophies), neither the homogeneous and spherical be-
ing of  Parmenides nor ontotheology (in the Kantian sense of  the 
term), the Kojevean “hiatus irrationalis,”49 which is characteristic of  
“the gulf  between the worldly and the ‘otherworldly,’50” is a pivotal 
articulation in ‘the philosophy of  the non-existent.’ Partly outlined 
in Atheism, this articulation is an essential constitutive element of  
Kojève’s system of  knowledge.
   ‡ ‡ ‡
We live in a world of  extreme polarisation in politics, in lifestyles 
47  Jacques Lacan, “Hiatus irrationalis” Le Pahre de Neuilly, 3/4 ([1929] 
1933).
48  For Rickert, the hiatus irrationalis shows how historical knowledge de-
pends on the irrationality of  reality. See Heinrich Rickert, The Limits of  Concept 
Formation in Natural Science: a logical introduction to the historical sciences. Trans. Guy 
Oakes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986). The “early” Husserl 
argued against Rickert and the neo-Kantians’ theses on the irrationality of  real-
ity, and used his phenomenological method to close up the “hiatus” between the 
intelligible and irrational in the Umwelt. 
49  Ibid., 55.
50  Ibid., 109.
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and tastes; the world of  square circles and alternative facts. “The 
fate of  our times,” as Weber famously observed, “is characterized 
… above all, by the ‘disenchantment’ of  the world.”51 In an un-
canny way, Atheism ripples through The Black Circle, displacing the 
disenchantment of  the latter into the “swamp”52 of  the former. 
What The Black Circle’s “Russian context”53 lacks in Russianness, 
it makes up for in generalizations of  the Russian character. The 
book seems unmistakably symptomatic of  the current perceptions 
regarding Russia’s illicit geopolitical interventionism in the affairs 
of  Western states. At first, the book remains hesitant as to whether 
Kojève was “a progressive thinker, a Marxist, or a jocular misan-
thrope, a sort of  Mephistopheles, or both.”54 Ultimately, the au-
thor settles for ‘Christian apologist,’ and ‘a modern day Judas’ as his 
final word on Kojève. It is quite puzzling that after reaching this rather 
bald conclusion, Jeff Love went on to translate Atheism, a compen-
dium of  the very ‘foreign doctrines’ which The Black Circle had all 
along denounced as being incommensurable with Western ideals. 
Many of  Kojève’s commentators who slighted his work and 
sought to exorcise their unhealthy fascination with his philosophy, 
later went on to double up as his translators. Jeff Love is neither the 
first nor perhaps the last instance of  these puzzling cases of  intel-
lectual inconsistency. What is one to make of  this bipolar approach 
to Kojève’s legacy? Perhaps the answer to this bewildering riddle 
can be found in Kojève’s preface to Bataille’s A-Theological Sum: “if  
there is only one possible way to say the truth, there are countless 
ways to silence it [for oneself].”55
51  Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation” in From Max Weber: Essays in So-
ciology, eds. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (1949; London: Routledge, 1970), 
154.
52  Alexandre Kojève, Atheism, 76-77.
53  Jeff Love, The Black Circle, 6.
54  Ibid., 177.
55  Alexandre Kojève, “Préface à l’œuvre de Georges Bataille” L’Arc, 44 
([1950] 1971), 36.
